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EVAL.UATION OF THE SAFETY OF THE CSE SR-100 
SELF-CONTAINED SELF-RESCUER 
By R. W. Watson,1 R. L. Brewer,2 W. J. Doyak,3 and A. L. Furno4 
ABSTRACT 
A belt-wearable self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR) manufactured by the CSE Corp. and designated 
the "SR-1OO" was evaluated for safety in the underground mine environment by the U.S. Bureau of 
Mines. The evaluation consisted of laboratory tests on the chemicals contained in the unit and field 
trials to simulate the mine environment. This report summarizes the test results and compares the 
results with those from earlier tests with chemical and compressed oxygen self-rescuers. It was 
concluded that the new SCSR did not pose any different or more severe hazards than the earlier units. 
In view of the mine-proven safety record of the SCSR's now in service, no reason could be found to 
disallow use of the belt-wearable unit. 
1 Research supervisor. 
2Physical science technician. 
3Mechanical engineering technician. 
4Physical scientist (retired). 
Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Federal regulation (30 CFR 75.1714), which went in-
to effect on June 21, 1981, requires that every person who 
goes into an underground coal mine in the United States 
must be supplied with an SCSR. An SCSR is a self-
contained, closed-circuit, emergency breathing apparatus 
designed for mine escape purposes. 
All SCSR's intended for in-mine use must be approved 
by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) and the Mine Safety and Health Admin-
istration (MSHA) under a schedule given in 30 CFR 11, 
Subpart H, for 6O-min-duration breathing apparatus. Both 
chemical oxygen and compressed oxygen SCSR's have 
received NIOSH-MSHA approval; as of July 1, 1982, five 
different SCSR's were commercially available. 
In early 1989, the U.S. Bureau of Mines was requested 
by MSHA to evaluate a new belt-wearable SCSR for po-
tential hazards associated with the general use of this 
device in underground coal mines; the self-rescuer was 
manufactured by the CSE Corp. and was designated the 
"SR-100." A test protocol was agreed at a planning 
meeting held on March 8, 1989, which was attended by 
representatives of the Government and the mining 
industry, including the Bureau, MSHA, the American 
Mining Congress, the Bituminous Coal Operators 
Association, the U nited M ine Workers of America, the 
R&P and Consolidation Coal companies, the CSE Corp., 
and the National Mine Service Co. The protocol was 
based on previous hazard evaluations performed on 1-h 
self-rescuers containing oxygen-generating chemicals (1)5 
or compressed oxygen (2). 
Commercial units became available in early April 1989, 
and the experimental work was started shortly thereafter. 
This report summarizes the experimental fmdings with the 
SR-100; comparisons are made with the earlier work. 
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF UNIT TESTED 
The SR-100 is a closed-circuit, self-contained oxygen 
supply system designed for use in toxic or oxygen-
deficient atmospheres. The unit is 7.75 in (19.7 cm) 
high, 5.5 in (14.0 cm) wide, and 4.0 in (10.2 cm) thick 
and weighs 5.7 lb (2.6 kg). Starting oxygen is provided 
by a small compressed oxygen bottle, and the rest, by 
chemical means. The rated duration of the oxygen supply 
is 60 min. There are two chemical beds in the unit. A 
small bed at the bottom of the stainless steel housing 
contains 1.8 oz (50 g) of lithium hydroxide (LiOH). 
Above this bed and filling the remainder of the housing 
(which also contains the oxygen bottle) is a mixture of 
20.6 oz (585 g) of potassium superoxide (KOJ and 
4.2 oz (120 g) of LiOH. Stainless steel screens and 
fiberglass ftIters separate and contain the beds in the 
housing. 
The self-rescuer is encased in a stainless steel (AISI 
Type 304) housing, which has a plastic (PVC-Kydex 
brand)6 wraparound (fig. lA). The unit opens by means 
of a top latch similar to that used in existing ftIter self-
rescuers. Opening the top latch causes the top and 
5ltalic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
at the end of this report. 
6Reference to specific products does not imply endorsement by the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines. 
bottom covers to fall away, exposing the neck strap, 
breathing hose, mouthpiece, nose clips at the top, and 
the breathing bag and protective goggles at the bottom 
(fig. lB). Pulling a fluorescent orange tag wired to the 
oxygen valve releases the starter oxygen into the breath-
ing bag. Moisture in the exhaled breath activates the 
K02, releasing oxygen. Carbon dioxide (C02) in the 
exhaled breath is absorbed by the LiOH and the potassi-
um hydroxide (KOH) resulting from the K02-water reac-
tion. Figure 1e shows the components of a disassembled 
unit. 
The oxygen bottle (fig. ill) is 3.625 in (9.21 cm) long . 
and 1.25 in (3.18 cm) in diameter; it contains 0.25 to 
0.28 ft3 (7 to 8 L) of oxygen at a working pressure of 
2,250 psi (15.5 X 1()6 Pa). It has, as a safety device, a 
frangible disk soldered into the valve end of the bottle. 
This disk is designed to fail at 125% of the working pres-
sure, 2,812 psi (19.4 x 1()6 Pa) . 
The SR-100 can be stored in the temperature range 
from 32° F COO C) to 130° F (5SO C). Its service life is 
5 years as long as the color in the moisture indicator at 
the top of the unit remains blue. If the indicator color 
changes to pink or white, the unit is no longer suitable for 
use. Service life extensions may be offered contingent on 
field sampling. 
; 
Figure 1.--Constructlon features of SR-100. A, Complete unit; B, unit ready for use; C, disassembled canister; D, oxygen bottle. 
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TEST PROCEDURES AND RESULTS 
The test protocol consisted of some preliminary 
experiments designed to provide a quick estimate of the 
potential hazards of the SR-100 in order to assure 
operational safety in conducting more realistic destructive 
tests to follow. The preliminary experiments consisted 
of drop weight impact and burning rate tests on the 
K02-LiOH mix used in the SR-100, and bullet impact and 
bonfIre tests with complete units. A few tests involving 
the reaction of the K02-LiOH mixture with water and the 
injection of water into complete units were also conducted. 
The preliminary experiments were followed by ex-
periments involving various forms of mechanical abuse 
anticipated for the units when deployed in a hostile 
mine environment. These included roof falls, heavy 
equipment runover, and accidental encounters with a 
feeder-breaker. 
The results of these experiments are discussed in this 
report; comparisons with the earlier work reported in 
references 1 and 2 are made where possible. 
PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS 
DROP WEIGHT IMPACT TESTS 
The main chemical bed in the SR-100 consists of a 
physical mixture of K02 and LiOH. The older chemical 
SCSR units contained a single bed of K02 and depended 
on the formation of KOH (from K02 and exhaled mois-
ture) for scavenging CO2, K02 is a yellow solid having 
a specifIc gravity of 2.14 and a melting point of 380° F 
(193° C). It is a very strong oxidizer, and while it has no 
inherent explosive properties it can form explosive or 
rapidly burning mixtures when combined with any com-
bustible material. The chemistry of K02 is more fully 
described in reference 1. 
LiOH is a colorless (or white) chemical that has a 
specifIc gravity of 1.46 and a melting point of 462° F 
(239° C). It is not self-reactive and does not react with 
K02 at ordinary temperatures. It is a strong caustic agent, 
and its principal use is as an electrolyte in storage batteries 
and as an absorber of CO2 in self-rescuers, space vehicles, 
etc. 
The mechanical sensitivity of the K02-LiOH mixture 
alone and combined with various combustibles that would 
be found in coal mines was determined using the drop 
weight test that had been used in previous work (1). In 
this test, an O.28-oz (8.0-g) sample of the material is 
distributed in a uniform layer over a 4.0-in (lO-cm) 
diameter circular steel anvil. The sample is then struck by 
a 187-lb (85-kg) steel drop weight released from various 
heights to determine a go or no-go condition. Data from 
tests on the K02-LiOH mix alone and with crushed coal 
(through No. 8 and on No. 14 sieves), hydraulic oil, 
and No. 2 diesel fuel added to the mix are presented in 
table 1. For comparison purposes, results from similar 
tests with lump K02 separated from the K02-LiOH mix 
are also presented, along with the results of tests with 
5010 smokeless powder. 
As expected, the K02 and the K02-LiOH failed to re-
act at the maximum drop height of 8 ft (2.44 m). The 
K02-LiOH and combustible mixtures all failed to react at 
1 ft (0.305 m) but gave off smoke and sparks at 2 ft 
(0.61 m) and above. None of these reactions were judged 
to be explosions inasmuch as they did not produce audible 
reports. The K02 combustible mixes all failed to react at 
0.5 ft (0.15 m) but exploded with loud reports at 1 ft 
(0.305 m). Thus, the K02-LiOH combustible mixtures 
were less sensitive to drop weight impact than the K02 
combustible mixtures. This is probably due to a cushion-
ing effect provided by the LiOH. The smokeless powder 
exhibited about the same sensitivity as the K02-LiOH 
combustible mixtures but produced an explosion rather 
than just smoke and sparks at the critical drop height. 
BURNING RATE MEASUREMENTS 
Burning rates were measured using the United Nations 
test method for readily combustible solids (3). In this test, 
a lO-in (250-mm) long train of sample with a triangular 
cross section 0.4 in (10 mm) high by 0.8 in (20 mm) wide 
is placed ona plate of low heat conductivity and ignited 
with a small flame at one end. Burning times are then re-
corded over a 4-in (l00-mm) length of the sample starting 
3 in (80 mm) from the ignition end. 
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Table 1.-Hesults of 187-lb (8S-kg) drop weight tests 
Test sample 
K02-UOH mix ... 
50% K02-LiOH mix, 
50% crushed coal. 
00 ......... . 
00 ......... . 
00 ......... . 
91 % K02-LiOH mix, 
9% hydraulic oil. 
00 ......... . 
00 ......... . 
00 ......... . 
91 % K02-LiOH, 
9% diesel fuel. 
00 ......... . 
00. 
00. 
K02 •..••••...• 
50% K02, 50% 
crushed coal. 
Drop 
height, ft 
8 
2 
3 
4 
2 
3 
4 
2 
3 
4 
8 
. 5 
Results 
No reaction ....... . 
· . do ........... . 
No explosion ...... . 
· . do ........ . • . . 
· . do ...... . .•.•. 
No reaction ....... . 
No explosion ...... . 
.. do . . . . ..... . . • 
· . do ........... . 
No reaction ....... . 
· . do ........... . 
· . do ...........• 
No explosion .. . ..•. 
No reaction ....... . 
No explosion ...... . 
None. 
00. 
Remarks 
Some smoke, sparks. 
00. 
00. 
None. 
Some smoke, sparks. 
00. 
00. 
None. 
00. 
00. 
Some smoke, sparks. 
None. 
Some smoke . 
00 ......... . Explosion ........ . Loud report. 
None. 91% K02, 9% 
hydraulic oil. 
.5 . No reaction ... . 
00 ......... . 1 Explosion ........ . Loud report. 
None. 91% K02, 9% 
diesel fuel. 
. 5 No reaction ....... . 
00 ......... . Explosion ..•...... Loud report. 
SmOkeless powder 1 
2 
No explosion ......• Some smoke. 
Loud report. 00 ......... . Explosion ........ . 
Burning rates are calculated and expressed as inches (or 
millimeters) per second. Burning rate measurements for 
the K02-LiOH mixture combined with crushed (through 
No.8 and on No. 14 sieves) and dried Pittsburgh Seam 
coal are presented in table 2 along with comparison data 
for K02 and ammonium perchlorate (NH4CI03) mixed 
with dried crushed coal. As will be noted, the K02 and 
coal mixture burned about four times as fast as the 
K02-LiOH and coal mixture. This is due to the fact that 
there was less K02 available in the latter mixture and 
possibly to the presence of LiOH, which would serve as a 
heat sink. 
The burning rate of the K02-LiOH and coal mixture 
was in turn about four times as high as that of the 
NH4CI03 and coal mixture, which illustrates the strong 
oxidizing character of K02 compared with more common 
oxidizers. 
Table 2.-Burnlng rate measurements, Inches per second 
Test sample Rate 
50% K02-LiOH mix and 50% crushed coal ....... 0.122 
50% K02 and 50% crushed coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .508 
50% NH4C103 and 50% crushed coal ........... .030 
BONFIRE TRIALS 
The small oxygen bottle in the SR-100 is equipped with 
a safety relief device in the form of a frangible burst disk, 
which is soldered into a small recess machined around a 
0.0635-in (1.6-mm) orifice in the valve end of the bottle. 
This disk serves to prevent the buildup of excessive 
pressure in the bottle as a result of heat or overfilling. To 
check the performance of the relief disk and to observe 
the general behavior of the SR-100 under fIre exposure, 
two bonfIre trials were conducted with complete units. 
The units were placed on a steel grate (fIg. 24) placed 
over a 3-ft (O.91-m) square by 1-ft (O.3-m) deep steel box 
containing 45 gal (170 L) of water on which was floated 
10 gal (38 L) of kerosene with a small amount of gasoline 
added to promote ignition. The fuel was ignited with a 
0.35-oz (10-g) black powder ignitor (fIg. 28) and allowed 
to burn to completion, which normally took about 30 min. 
The two burns produced more or less identical results, 
which are illustrated in fIgure 2. Figure 2C shows the 
initial stages of the fIre, including considerable black 
smoke generated by the liquid fuel. About 5 min into the 
burn, a bright jet was observed to emanate from the unit 
I He HES 
I I I I I I I 
3 
I I I I 
Figure 2.-Bonfire testing. A-F, Scenes from test 2; G, unit from test 1; H, unit from test 2; I, bottle from test 2 showing relief orifice. 
in the vicinity of the well that contained the color moisture 
indicator. The jetting, which is visible near the right edge 
of the flames in figure W , grew in intensity for about 
3 min and started to die out after 4 min. This type of 
jetting was observed in previous tests with chemical 
SCSR's and is associated with the release of oxygen 
generated by the thermal decomposition of K02• At 
9 min, 45 s into the burn, there was a mild explosion, 
which kicked the SR-100 about 1 ft (0.3 m) toward the 
right edge of the grate. This event, which is believed to be 
associated with the operation of the pressure-relief device 
in tbe starter bottle, produced a bright flash of light and a 
cloud of white smoke, probably potassium oxide, a de-
composition product of K0 2 and/or some LiOH. The 
flash was not recorded in photographs of the event, but 
the cloud of smoke accompanying the flash is shown in 
figure 2.E. Figure 2F shows the end of the trial, 37 min 
after the start of the fIr e. Damage to the two units is 
shown in figures 2G and H and the oxygen bottle from 
test 2 showing the relief orifice is shown in figure 21. 
The bonfire trials with the SR-100 resulted in behavior 
very similar to that in previous bonfire tests with chemical 
SCSR's in terms of the observed jetting associated with the 
thermal decomposition ofK02 (1). The violence produced 
by the sudden release of oxygen from the starter bottle in 
the SR-100 was minor compared with the reactions ob-
served during the operation of the pressure-relief devices 
in the compressed oxygen SCSR's (2) . 
BULLET IMPACT TRIALS 
To effect a comparison with earlier work on SCSR's 
(1-2) a number of bullet impact trials were conducted with 
the SR-100 and with oxygen bottles removed from SR-100 
units. While bullet impact does not represent a realistic 
mine accident scenario, the test does provide some 
information on the inherent hazards of this type of device. 
The experimental setup (figs. 3A and B) consisted of a 
30/06 rifle mounted on a portable carriage and a wooden 
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target stand. Steel-jacketed bullets (military 0.30 caliber 
M2 ball) were fIred at the units from a distance of approx-
imately 85 ft (26 m); the muzzle velocity for this ammuni-
tion is reported to be 2,970 ft /s (905 m/ s) . 
The results of four tests with complete units and two 
tests with oxygen bottles removed from units are sum-
marized in table 3. Two trials in which bullets perforated 
the K02-LiOH chemical bed within the canisters (trials 1 
and 4) resulted in short-lived fires. The more severe rue, 
which occurred in test 4, is shown in fIgure 3C. In this 
test, the heat-insulating band around the metal canister 
ignited at the exit hole (fig. 3D) and burned for about 
1 min; it was self-extinguishing. No sign of rue was ob-
served in the two trials (tests 2 and 3) involving perfora-
tion of the oxygen bottles within the units. However, the 
units were projected forward to distances of 5 ft (1.5 m) 
and 10 ft (3.0 m) for tests 2 and 3, respectively, pre-
sumably as a result of the rapid release of oxygen. 
The exit hole generated in test 2 is shown in figure 3E. 
In the two trials with oxygen bottles alone, brief flashes 
of light were observed on impact but there was no sus-
tained fire or evidence of metal burns on the recovered 
oxygen bottles. The bottles used in tests 5 and 6 were 
projected forward to distances of 15 ft (4.6 m) and 10 ft 
(3 m), respectively. The bottle from test 5 is shown in 
figure 3F . 
The results of bullet impact tests 1 and 4 with the 
SR-100 closely paralleled previous bullet impact trials with 
the chemical SCSR's reported in reference 1, in which 
short-lived rues were observed. However, the SR-100 
trials involving perforation of the oxygen bottles were 
much less dramatic than similar trials with the compressed 
oxygen SCSR's reported in reference 2. In the earlier 
tests, particularly those involving larger aluminum oxygen 
bottles, bullet impact produced spectacular showers of 
sparks and copious quantities of white smoke, as a result 
of metal combustion around the entrance and exit holes. 
There was no indication of this type of reaction with the 
small stainless steel bottles in the SR-100. 
Table 3.-SummarY of bullet Impact trials 
Test Unit Impact point Result 
1 Complete unit .. Chemical bed . . Short-lived fire. 
2 do . . . . .... Oxygen bottle .. Unit projected forward'" 5 ft, no flame. 
3 
· . 
do .... . .. . . . do. . ... , .. Unit projected forward'" 10 ft, no flame. 
4 
· . 
do . . , ... . Chemical bed .. Short-lived fire. 
5 Bottle ........ Oxygen bottle . . Impact flash; bottle projected forward '" 15 ft. 
6 
· . 
do ........ .. do. I ••• •• • Impact flash; bottle projected forward '" 10 ft. 
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Figure 3.-Bullet Impact trials. A-B, Experimental setup; C, fire In test 4; D, exit hole In test 4; E, exit hole In test 2; F, oxygen bottle 
from test 5. 
REACTION OF K02-LiOH WITH WATER 
As described in reference 1, the reaction of K02 
with excess water produces significant quantities of heat, 
primarily associated with the heat of solution of KOH, 
one of the products of the K02- H 20 reaction. The 
dissolution of LiOH in water is also exothermic, but the 
heat of solution is significantly less than that of KOH, 
331 Btu/lb-mol (4.4 kcal/mol) versus 411 Btu/lb-mol 
(12.8 kcal/mol); the solubility of LiOH is also significantly 
less than that of KOH. In order to compare the heat-
generating potential of the K02-LiOH mixture contained 
in SR-100 with that observed in previous water stimulation 
tests with K02 alone (1), a few experiments were 
conducted using the same experimental apparatus used in 
the earlier study: an insulated dewar flask equipped with 
a coiled metal feed tube for injecting water into a bed of 
K02-LiOH placed in the bottom of the flask. As in the 
previous experiments, the chemical bed was covered with 
a layer of crushed Pittsburgh Seam coal (minus 1/4 in) to 
insulate the K02-LiOH layer and also to determine what 
coal temperatures would be produced in the vicinity of the 
chemical bed. 
Data from two experiments are presented in table 4, 
which gives the amount of water added, the maximum 
temperature observed in the K02-LiOH bed, and the 
maximum coal temperatures measured at 1.0 in (2.54 cm) 
and 4.0 in (10.16 cm) above the chemical layer. In the 
flrst test, just enough water was added to react the K02 
in the chemical bed (approximately 11 oz (330 cm3)) 
and dissolve the resultant KOH. The water was added 
in increments over a period of 177 min. The maximum 
K02-LiOH temperature of 20T F (9T C) was observed 
132 min after the start of the experiment when 9 oz 
(270 cm3) of water had been added; the temperature 
declined after this. 
In the second experiment, 22 oz (660 cm3) of water 
was added over a period of 164 min. The maximum 
K02-LiOH temperature of 2500 F (1210 C) occurred after 
the addition of 11 oz (330 cm3) of water, 25 min after the 
start of the experiment; the tern perature gradually declined 
thereafter. 
Table 4.-Reaction of K02-UOH mix with water, 
maximum temperature, degrees Fahrenheit 
(1.5 Ib K02-UOH covered by 5.5 Ib coal) 
Water addition ....... .. , • • • • . . . . .. OZ ., 
K02-UOH ...... . .. .. . ..... , , . ... . . . , .. . 
Coal: 
1 in (2.54 cm) above K02-UOH layer ...... . 
4 in (10.16 cm) above K02-UOH layer .. .... , 
11 
207 
140 
108 
22 
250 
165 
120 
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The maximum temperatures observed in these two tests 
were lower than the temperatures recorded in the earlier 
tests (1), probably because of the reduced mass of K0 2 
used in these later experiments. The presence of the 
LiOH in the mix did not appear to contribute to observed 
temperature rises, presumably because of its poor solu-
bility in water. There was no sign of any thermal reaction 
in the coal above the chemical bed. 
WATER ACTIVATION 
As discussed in an earlier investigation report (1), a 
self-rescuer can be accidentally buried in a coal pile in a 
wet environment. Water invasion of a self-contained 
chemical unit can lead to elevated temperatures having 
some potential for igniting the coal either directly or in-
directly by inducing a self-sustained spontaneous combus-
tion reaction. Both of these possibilities were discounted 
for the older chemical SCSR's on the basis of coal tem-
perature measurements in the vicinity of SCSR's injected 
with water and considerations of the minimum thermal 
energy required for the initiation of a self-sustained 
spontaneous combustion reaction. Since the SR -100 
differs from the earlier designs in physical size, chemi-
cal makeup, and other features that might affect its 
capacity to supply heat during water invasion, two experi-
ments involving water activation of complete SR-lOOs were 
conducted. 
In the flIst experiment, an SR-100 was opened and 
the top and bottom covers were removed to expose the 
breathing hose and mouthpiece at the top of the unit 
and the breathing bag at the bottom. The unit was then 
equipped with 11 thermocouples to monitor temperatures 
within and outside the unit. The internal thermocouple 
leads were brought out through the breathing hose and 
sealed into the mouthpiece with a silicone compound to 
keep the unit gastight. To inject water into the unit, a 
length of flexible plastic tubing that extended to the top of 
the chemical bed was brought out through the breathing 
hose and sealed at the mouthpiece. The instrumented unit 
is shown in flgure 4A. 
The unit was placed on a 3.0-in (7.6-cm) deep layer of 
dry crushed Pittsburgh Seam coal (3/8 in (1.0 cm) or less) 
at the bottom of a steel drum 24 in (61 cm) in diameter 
by 24 in (61 cm) high, which was then filled with coal 
(flgs. 4B-C). 
In this flISt experiment, the restraining link in the relief 
valve located at the top of the unit was not removed; this 
prevented normal operation of the valve. The restraining 
link is present to assure that the self-rescuer remains 
gastight until the breathing bag is inflated and is pulled 
10 
.. 
~ .. 
Figure 4.- Water activation experiments. A, Unit equipped with thermocouples; B, unit positioned on coalbed; C, unit covered with 
coal; 0, unit recovered from first test; E, unit recovered from second test; F, new and disintegrated valve covers. 
automatically during bag inflation by a wire connecting the 
link to the breathing bag. 
At the start of the experiment (t '" 0 min), 5 oz 
(150 cm3) of water was injected into the chemical bed. As 
expected, the temperature at the center of the bed started 
to rise in 2 min, peaked in 10 min at a temperature of 
2210 F (1050 C), and gradually began cooling. This is 
shown in the thermocouple records of figure 5. An 
additional 5 oz (150 cm3) of water was added at t '" 24 
min. The immediate result of this second addition was 
rapid lowering of the temperature followed by a rapid 
temperature rise, peaking at 30 min at a temperature of 
2500 F (1210 C) . 
At the start of this second addition of water, pressure 
began building up in the self-rescuer. The corrugated 
rubber hose connecting tbe case with the mouthpiece 
began to expand and extended approximately 3.0 in 
(7.6 cm) above the coal surface; it was difficult to force the 
final 3.4 oz (100 cm3) water into the tube. With about 
1.7 oz (50 cm3) left to add, the coalbed surrounding the 
unit began to rise slightly, followed by a sudden release of 
pressure. Then the last 1.7 oz (50 cm3) was easily injected, 
indicating that some component had failed and the unit 
was no longer gastight. Since the temperature was again 
dropping, another 5 oz (150 cm3) of water was added at a 
time 46 min into the test. Again there was a sudden drop 
in temperature followed by a temperature rise in the 
center of the chemical bed to 2030 F (950 C) at 55 min. 
As peak temperatures were now decreasing, no additional 
water was added. All temperatures were continually 
monitored for an additional 17 h; however, all tem-
peratures continued to fall. Note that the highest 
temperature was recorded in the chemical bed following 
the second injection of 5 oz (150 cm3) of water. The 
maximum temperatures and the times of their occurrence 
are summarized in table 5. 
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Figure 5.-Thermocouple records from first water activation 
test (relief valve Inoperative). 
Table 5.-Maxlmum temperatures observed 
during water activation tests 
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Relief valve inoperative Relief valve operative 
Location Temp, Time Into Temp, Time into 
OF test, min OF test, min 
K0 2-UOH layer , . 250 32 219 92 
Metal case ... . . 154 50 205 97 
Plastic band .... 113 97 136 122 
Relief valve 1~7 ..s 289 93 
Coal' , . .... ," 72 382 115 112 
'3 in above K0 2-UOH layer. 
Removal of the coal surrounding the unit revealed that 
the rubber breathing bag had failed. As shown in fig-
ure 4D, it failed at one of the midseams because of the 
excess oxygen pressure buildup within the unit, which did 
not escape by way of the relief valve. 
In the second experiment, the pressure-relief valve 
restraining link was removed before the unit was buried in 
the coalbed, thus allowing the relief valve to operate nor-
mally. Water was injected into the chemical bed in 5-oz 
(150-cm3) increments at the beginning of the experiment 
(t '" 0) and at t '" 28, 57, 83, and 105 min. The thermo-
couple record from this test is shown in figure 6, and the 
maximum observed temperatures and the times at which 
they occurred are given in table 5. 
In the second experiment, the observed maxim~m tem-
peratures were significantly higher than in the first ex-
periment, except in the K02-LiOH bed. Of particular in-
terest was the sudden rise in the temperature of the relief 
valve and the metal case in the vicinity of the valve after 
the fourth injection of water at t '" 83 min. Examination 
of the unit following the test showed that the aluminum 
cap over the relief valve had mostly disintegrated, leaving 
a crystalline residue (figs. 4E-F). Analysis by X-ray 
diffraction showed that the crystalline residue was mostly 
aluminum hydroxide (Al(OH)3)' 
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Figure 6.-Thermocouple records from second water activation 
test (relief valve operative). 
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Evidently, with the fourth injection of water, the oxygen 
venting through the relief valve carried with it some KOH 
(product of water and K0 2), which reacted with the alu-
minum to form Al(OH3)' 
The maximum temperatures observed in this test for 
the chemical bed and the metal case were close to those 
observed in previous tests with chemical SCSR's (1). The 
plastic bands on the SR-100 served to limit exterior tem-
peratures, and the maximum coal temperature observed in 
this test, 115" F (46° C), was about the same as the 
maximum coal temperature observed in a similar test with 
a chemical SCSR, 104° F (40° C). On the basis of the 
earlier tests, it was concluded that chemical SCSR's did 
not present a coal ignition or spontaneous combustion 
problem (1). Since the maximum temperatures observed 
in this test were of the same order as those observed in 
the earlier tests and since the total available energy is less 
for the SR-100 (less K02) , it can be concluded that the 
SR-100 does not pose any significant hazard in terms of 
direct coal ignition or induced spontaneous combustion. 
MECHANICAL INTEGRITY OF UNIT 
In previous work on the potential hazards of SCSR's, a 
number of experiments designed to simulate "worst mining 
conditions" were conducted in an effort to determine what 
level of abuse the SCSR's could sustain without releasing 
their contents, chemicals or oxygen, and the consequences 
of such release when it did occur. These experiments 
included drop weight tests to simulate a roof fall, runover 
tests with heavy equipment, and tests where individual 
units were fed through a feeder-breaker. Similar tests 
were performed with the SR-100 to measure its response 
for comparison with the earlier work. 
SIMU~TED ROOF FALL 
The experimental arrangement used to simulate mine 
roof fall, illustrated in figure 7A , was the same as that 
used in previous tests of this type (1) . It consisted of a 
1,()()(J-Ib (455-kg) cubical block of reinforced concrete that 
was dropped from a height of 6 ft (1.8 m) on complete 
units placed in a vertical or horizontal position beneath the 
block. Observations were then made of the subsequent 
damage to the units. The results of these experiments are 
summarized in table 6 and shown in figure 7B through G. 
In the three trials conducted with the units in the hori-
zontal position, the most severe damage occurred in test 1 
where there was a small amount of K02-LiOH released 
and a slow bleedoff of oxygen from the starter bottle. In 
two of the tests with units in the vertical position there was 
a rapid release of oxygen from the starter bottles accom-
panied by a hissing sound (test 2) or a cloud of dust 
(test 5). There was no evidence of flame in any of the 
simulated roof-fall trials. 
In previous trials with the older chemical units, no 
release of chemical was observed in seven experiments, but 
there was one test where an oxygen candle was ignited (1). 
In eight tests with compressed oxygen units using the same 
experimental setup as used here, there were seven in-
stances of oxygen leakage; in five trials with a pointed rock 
fragment attached to the concrete drop weight there were 
three instances of oxygen leakage. In one test, a combus-
tion reaction was observed when the rock shard punctured 
the aluminum oxygen bottle (2). Owing to the small size 
of the oxygen bottle in the SR-100, no attempt was made 
to duplicate this type of behavior. Overall, the SR-100 
behaved pretty much like the SCSR's previously tested: 
They withstood the simulated roof falls with inconsequen-
tial release of contents. 
Test 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Table 6.-Results of simulated roof-fall experiments 
Orientation 
Horizontal 
Vertical . . 
Horizontal 
.. do ... 
Vertical .. 
do . . . 
Results 
Small amount chemical released, slow oxy-
gen leak. 
Small amount chemical released, rapid oxy-
gen release . 
No chemical release, no oxygen leak. 
Small amount chemical released, no oxygen 
leak. 
Considerable chemical released , rapid oxy-
gen release . 
No chemical release, no oxygen leak. 
EQUIPMENT RUNOVER TRIALS 
Two pieces of heavy equipment were available for these 
trials: An International TD-20 bulldozer, which weighed 
about 24 st (21,800 kg) and had a cleated track, and a Joy 
16 CM continuous miner with an estimated weight of 50 st 
(45,500 kg), also with a cleated track. Complete units 
were run over in the forward and reverse directions (bull-
dozer only), with units perpendicular an~/parallel to the 
direction of motion, and with the units on a slate (bulldoz-
er) or concrete (continuous miner) roadbed or on a small 
coalbed (both). Some units were repeatedly run over, 
from two to as many as six times. In some tests track slip-
page was purposely induced in order to maximize damage. 
The test results from the bulldozer runs are summarized 
in table 7. Scenes from the runs are shown in figure &4 -C, 
and the damaged units are shown in figure 8D-F. 
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Table 7.-Summary of bulldozer runover trials 
Run and direction 
Without coal: 1 
Test 1: 
1, forward 
2, reverse 
With coal: 2 
Test 2: 
1, forward 
2, reverse 
Test 3: 
1, forward 
2, reverse 
3, forward 
4, reverse 
5, forward 
Result 
Unit damaged, no chemical released. 
Puff of dust, no chemical released. 
Audible pop and puff of dust, some chemical 
released. 
More damage, no other action. 
Unit damaged, no chemical released. 
More damage, no chemical released. 
00. 
More damage, some chemical released. 
Track slippage; much morA damage, more 
chemical released . 
6, reverse Track slippage; unit destroyed, some sparking. 
IUnit orientation perpendicular to direction of motion . 
2Unit orientation parallel to direction of motion. 
In test 1 with the bulldozer, no chemical was released 
after a forward and reverse pass; however, the oxygen bot-
tle failed on the second (reverse) pass. In test 2, the 
oxygen bottle failed during the first pass and some chemi-
cal was released; there was more damage to the unit in the 
second pass but no further action. On comparing test 2 
with test 1, it appeared that aligning the unit parallel 
(lengthwise) to the direction of travel represented the 
"worst case." Subsequent runs were made this way. In 
test 3, with the unit on a bed of fine coal, no chemical was 
released as a result of the first three passes but a small 
amount of the K02-LiOH mixture was released during the 
fourth pass. In pass 5 with track slippage more chemical 
was released, and in pass 6, also with slippage, some 
sparking was observed under the track in the vicinity of the 
damaged unit, as well as chemical discharge. However, 
there was no sustained fire. An attempt was made to 
produce sparking with the machine slipping on the slate 
roadbed alone, but no sparking was observed. It was 
concluded that the sparking observed in test 3, pass 6, was 
associated with frictional ignition of a mixture of loose 
K02 and coal. In an unofficial demonstration test, another 
attempt was made to reproduce the sparking observed in 
test 3 by repeatedly slipping the bulldozer over a unit on 
a coalbed; no such sparking was observed. 
Test results from the continuous miner runover trials 
are summarized in table 8. Scenes from some of the more 
eventful trials are reproduced in figure 9A-F, and the total 
damage sustained by the units is shown in figure 10. In 
test 1, without coal, the oxygen bottle discharged on the 
first pass, producing a puff of floor dust (fig. 9C). This 
same behavior was noted in test 2 with coal. During the 
second passes of tests 1 and 2, attempts to slip the track of 
the continuous miner while it was passing over the units 
met with marginal success and only a modest twisting ac-
tion was effected by varying the power fed to the opposing 
tracks. In an attempt to increase the violence of this ma-
neuver, the subsequent tests (3, 4, 5, and 6) were conduct-
ed with the head of the continuous miner butted against a 
huge block of simulated coal located in the equipment test 
facility where the trials were conducted. The resistance to 
forward motion provided by the block of simulated coal 
resulted in total track slippage over the coal-covered units. 
This action produced much more damage, as can be seen 
by comparing figures 10C, D , E , and F with figures lOA 
and B. In fact, in test 6 enough frictional heating occurred 
to start a small fire in the remnants of the unit (fig. 10F); 
bright sparking of the heated chemicals and coal dust in-
side the damaged unit persisted for some time after the 
fire had died out (fig. lOF). 
In equipment runover trials the SR-100 fared no better, 
or worse, than the earlier SCSR's did in similar tests. The 
chemical units reported in reference 1 did not release any 
K0 2 in normal (no slipping or tramming) runover tests 
with rubber-tired or tracked vehicles including a continu-
ous miner. The older compressed oxygen units were not 
quite as immune to this type of abuse since fires were oc-
casionally observed in "normal" continuous miner runover 
trials (2). The SR-100 did produce a small fire under con-
ditions of extreme abuse that are difficult to imagine under 
ordinary mining conditions. Further quantifying this com-
parison, the SR-100 behaved more like the older chemical 
units than the older compressed oxygen units in the equip-
ment runover trials. This, of course, is in keeping with the 
nature of their construction. 
Table 8.-Summary of continuous miner runover trials 
Run and direction 
Without coal: 
Test 1:1 
1, forward 
2, forward, slippage 
With coal : 
Test 2:1 
1, forward 
2, forward, slippage 
Test 3:2 
1, forward, slippage 
Test 4:2 
1, forward , slippage 
Test 5:1 
1, forward , slippage 
Test 6:1 
1, forward , slippage 
Result 
Puff of dust, no chemical released . 
More damage, no chemical released. 
Cloud of dust, no chemical released. 
More damage, some chemical released . 
Cloud of dust, unit destroyed , some 
chemical released . 
Unit destroyed, some chemical released. 
Unit destroyed, some chemical released. 
Small fire, sparking, unit 
some chemical released . 
destroyed, 
lUnit orientation perpendicular to direction of motion . 
2Unit orientation parallel to direction of motion. 
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Figure 8.-Bulldozer runover trials. A, Unit perpendicular to direction of travel; B, unit parallel to direction of travel on coalbed; 
C, puff of smoke observed In test 2, run 1; D, total damage to unit in test 1; E, total damage to unit In test 2; F, total damage to unit in 
test 3. 
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Figure 9.-Contlnuou81 miner runover trials. A, Unit without coal; B, unit with coal; C, puff of dust, test 1, run 1; D, cloud of dust, 
test 2, run 1; E, small fire In test 6; F, sparking In test 6. 
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Figure 10.-Oamage sustained in continuous miner runover trials. A-F, Tests 1 through 6, respectively. 
-, 
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FEEDER-BREAKER TRIALS 
The feeder-breaker experiments were conducted with 
the same equipment that was used in the previous work 
with chemical and compressed oxygen SCSR's: a Long-
Airdox, Rosco 1 feeder-breaker. Three types of experi-
ments were performed. In the fIrst series of tests, 
complete units were more or less randomly fed through 
the feeder-breaker, a possible mine accident scenario. In 
the second series of tests, two of three picks in a breaker 
pick set were cut off to allow the remaining single pick to 
rotate approximately 270° after machine startup before 
striking an SR-lOO carefully positioned in the path of the 
single pick. In these tests, units were fIxed in a short 
section of channel iron to prevent movement. The third 
series of tests was similar to the second series in that the 
units were fIxed in the path of a single pick but the head 
of the feeder-breaker was locked down with chains to 
prevent upward movement and maximize the force of the 
impact. 
A few preliminary tests with randomly placed units 
verifIed a previous finding (1) that the units had a better 
chance of a damaging encounter with a breaker pick if 
they rode on coal piled high at the restricted entrance to 
the rotating pick assembly. As a consequence, all sub-
sequent "random" tests were performed in this manner. To 
fu rther enhance damage, the cutterhead was held in its 
lowest position with the picks rotating in an arc about 
2.5 in (6.4 cm) above the plates of the conveyor. 
A typical test with "randomly" placed units is shown in 
fIgure 11 and the results of 20 runs with 8 separate units 
are summarized in table 9. 
Figure 1L4 shows a unit placed on coal piled at the 
entrance to the rotating pick assembly; B shows the start 
of the run; and C shows the unit being fed out of the 
feeder-breaker. These scenes are from test 1, run 1, 
where the unit was struck by a pick and punctured, but not 
rotated, with no significant chemical release. In other 
runs, for example in test 1, run 4, the units slipped by the 
rotating pick assembly without encountering a pick, with 
little or no damage. In other runs, as in test 2, run 1, the 
units were impaled on a pick and rotated several turns, 
striking the upper crossarm or floor of the feeder-breaker. 
The latter event occasioned the most severe damage and 
chemical release. In one case, test 3, run 3, the oxygen 
bottle was punctured, which produced a puff of dust, but 
no impact flash. In another case, test 8, run 3, the chemi-
cal canister was punctured and a puff of smoke was ob-
served. A careful examination of the television tapes of 
this event did not show any impact flash. However, sub-
sequent examination of the unit showed some burn marks 
(charring) in the vicinity of the perforation hole in the 
plastic band that surrounds the metal canister, which was 
also punctured. This was the closest thing to a fire ob-
served in the feeder-breaker tests with randomly placed 
units. The total damage sustained by the eight units used 
in the series of tests is recorded in figure 12. 
Table 9.- Summary of feeder-breaker trials 
with randomly positioned units 
Run 
Test 1: 
1 .... .. . . . . 
2 .. . . . .. . . . 
3 .... . . . .. . 
4 .. . .. .... . 
5 ......... . 
Test 2: 
1 .. .. . . .. . . 
Test 3: 
1 .... . .... . 
2 .. .. . .... . 
3 . ... .. ... . 
Test 4: 
1 . .. . .. .. . . 
2 . . . ...... . 
3 ... .. , ... . 
4 .. ...... .. 
Test 5: 
1 . . .. . .... , 
Test 6: 
1 . ... . . .. . . 
2 . . . . ..... . 
Test 7: 
1 . . . . . .. . . . 
Test 8: 
1 ......... . 
2 ....... . . . 
3 ... .. .. , . , 
Result 
Unit punctu red, no rotation; no significant 
chemical release. 
End caps knocked off, bag exposed; no 
rotation, no significant chemical rel ease. 
Unit rotated 5 turns; no significant chemical 
re lease. 
Unit slipped by. 
Unit rotated 4 turns; small amount chemical 
released. 
Unit r,;peatedly punctured and rotated 
4-1/2 turns; no significant chemical release . 
Unit slipped by. 
00. 
Oxygen bottle punctured, puff of dust; unit 
rotated 19 turns to complete destruction; 
significant chemical released . 
Unit slipped by. 
Unit hit, outer plastic shell punctured; no 
significant chemical release. 
Unit hit; no chemical release. 
Unit rotated 3 turns to destruction; no 
significant chemical release. 
Unit rotated 1 turn to destruction; small amount 
chemical released . 
Unit wedged between pick set and rotated; 
minor damage. 
Unit rotated 2turns to destruction; no chemical 
release. 
Unit rotated 1 turn to destruction; some 
chemical released . 
Unit slipped by; minor damage. 
Do. 
Chemical canister punctured, puff of smoke 
but no sustained fire; some burn marks on 
plastic band ; some chemical released . 
Figure 11.-feeder-breaker trial with randomly placed unit. (test 1, 
run 1). A, Unit on coalbed; B, feeder-breaker running; C, unit being fed 
out of breaker. 
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Figure 12.-Total damage to units used in feeder-breaker trials with randomly placed units. A-H, Tests 1 through 8, respectively. 
The experimental setup for the trials with SR-100s fixed 
in the feeder-breaker is illustrated in figure 13. Trials 
were conducted with bare units (fig. 13A) or with units 
covered with coal (fig. 13B). In some cases, the unit was 
positioned to effect an impact on a region of the canister 
containing the chemical bed, and in others to allow impact 
on the oxygen bottle. Data from six feeder-breaker runs 
under these conditions are presented in table 10. Ordi-
narily the units were punctured and kicked through the 
breaker or rotated a number of times and kicked through 
without signifIcant chemical release. In test 2, the oxygen 
bottle was punctured, producing a cloud of coal dust but 
no flame. In test 3, with the unit covered with coal, a 
short-lived fire (2 to 3 s) was observed when the chemical 
canister was punctured; the fire was self-extinguishing. 
There was no photographic record of this event. In tests 
4 and 5, the oxygen bottles were struck by the descending 
pick but were not punctured. Damage to the SR-100's 
used in tests 1 through 5 with fixed units is shown in 
figures 13C through G, respectively. 
Table 10.-Summary of feeder-breaker trials with fixed units 
Run Impact point Results 
WITHOUT COAL COVER 
Test 1: 
1 Chemical bed Unit punctured, no rotation; no 
significant chemical release. 
2 . . do. .... Unit punctured, rotated 2-1/2 turns; 
no significant chemical release. 
Test 2: 1 . . Oxygen bottle Bottle punctured, unit rotated 
1 turn; puff of smoke but no 
flame. 
WITH COAL COVER 
Test 3: Chemical bed Unit punctured, no rotation; short-
lived fire . 
Test 4: Oxygen bottle Bottle not punctured, no rotation. 
Test 5: 1.. . . do. . ... Do. 
In tests 4 and 5 with the fixed units where attempts 
were made to perforate the oxygen bottles, the breaker 
assembly was observed to lift on impact. Therefore, 
several additional trials were conducted with the units 
fixed into position under the single pick and the breaker 
assembly locked with chains to prevent it from rising. This 
is illustrated in figure 14A, which shows the chains at both 
ends of the breaker arm. Data from six trials with the 
locked breaker are presented in table 11; the units were 
covered with coal in all six trials. Three trials were con-
ducted with the units positioned for penetration into the 
chemical bed and three for perforation of the oxygen 
bottle. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Test 
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Table 11.-Summary of locked feeder-breaker trIals 
Impact point 
Chemical bed 
.. do .. ... 
Oxygen bottle 
. . do . . ... 
Chemical bed 
Oxygen bottle 
Results 
Canister perforated; small flame on 
Impact, no sustained fire . 
Do. 
Bottle perforated, fireball on im-
pact; 17-min fire. 
Bottle perforated, fireball on im-
pact; no sustained fire. 
Canister perforated , no flame. 
Bottle perforated, fireball on im-
pact; 2Q-min fire. 
Short-duration flames were observed in two of the three 
trials involving penetration into the chemical bed; there 
were no sustained fires. Coal dust fireballs were produced 
in tests 3, 4, and 6, in which the Qxygen bottles were suc-
cessfully perforated; figure 14C shows the fireball for 
test 4. Sustained fues were also observed in tests 3 and 6. 
These fues involved the combustibles in the SR-100 
(breathing bag, goggles, straps, etc.) and lasted about 
20 min. They were not intense enough to ignite the coal 
in the feeder-breaker and were self-extinguishing. Total 
damage to the SR-100's used in the locked feeder-breaker 
trials is shown in figure 15. 
It is of interest to compare the results of the feeder-
breaker trials with the SR-100 with results obtained in 
similar studies reported in references 1 and 2. In the 
20 runs with randomly placed SR-l00's there were 6 in-
stances where the unit slipped by the pick assembly, 5 pick 
encounters without rotation, and 9 encounters where the 
unit was struck and rotated. Previous experiments with 
chemical units tested under similar experimental conditions 
(the "initial" feeder-breaker tests in reference 1) resulted 
in two slip-by's, one encounter without rotation, and four 
encounters with rotation: roughly the same frequency for 
the three different events as observed with the SR-100. 
However, in the previous tests, fues were observed in 
three runs out of seven: One fue was severe enough to 
completely destroy a chemical unit. In 20 random feeder-
breaker runs with the SR-100, no fues were observed ex-
cept, perhaps, the one instance where there was a puff of 
smoke with attendant burn marks on the plastic shell of 
the unit in test 8, run 3. Thus, it would appear that while 
the probability of a damaging encounter in the feeder-
breaker is about the same for the SR-100 as for the older 
(larger) chemical units, the consequences of such an en-
counter are somewhat less severe. This can be rational-
ized on the basis of the relative size and conditions of 
the units: The larger (older) units with heavier combusti-
ble loading ordinarily suffered more damage, released 
Figure 13.-J'eeder-breaker trials with fixed units. A, Unit fixed in channel iron; S, fixed unit covered with coal; C-G, damage results in tests 1 through 5, respectively. 
Figure 14.--l.ocked feeder-breaker trials. A, "Locked" feeder-breaker; 
B, fire observed In test 3; C, fireball observed in test 4. 
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Figure 15.-Oamage to units used In locked feeder-breaker trials. flrF, Tests 1 through 6, respectively. 
more chemical, and presented more opportunity for a 
K02-combustible fIre. In 20 random feeder-breaker trials 
with compressed oxygen units (2), the units suffered either 
superficial damage with no oxygen leaks (in 13 trials) or 
valve-gauge damage with oxygen leakage. No fIres were 
observed. Thus, the response of the SR-lOO to random 
transit through the feeder-breaker lies somewhere between 
the response of the older chemical units and that of the 
compressed oxygen units in terms of violence. 
In the older work, there is no direct counterpart for the 
SR-lOO trials conducted with fixed units and free breaker 
bar, so direct comparisons cannot be made. However, the 
SR-I00 trials with the locked breaker correspond to the 
fixed-unit, fixed-breaker trials reported in reference 2. In 
both cases, fireballs were ordinarily produced whenever 
the oxygen bottles were perforated: in three of three trials 
with the SR-I00 and in six of six trials with the 
compressed oxygen units. Qualitative comparisons of pho-
tographs indicated that the fueballs were somewhat 
smaller in tests with the SR-l00, probably because of the 
limited supply of oxygen in the SR-l00, starter bottle as 
compared with the I-h supply in the compressed oxygen 
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self-rescuers. However, it should be pointed out that 
sustained fires were observed in two out of three trials 
with the SR-l00 that produced fireballs, whereas this did 
not happen with the compressed oxygen self-rescuers. 
This is probably associated with the presence of K02 in 
the SR-l00. 
Overall, in the feeder-breaker trials, the SR-I00's 
behaved pretty much like the older chemical units when 
the chemical bed was penetrated and like the older 
compressed oxygen units when the starter bottle was 
penetrated, resulting in fires involving combustibles in the 
unit or fireballs associated with the rapid burning of coal 
dust in an oxygen-enriched atmosphere. Because of the 
smaller amounts of combustible material, chemicals, and 
compressed oxygen in the SR-l00, these events were not 
as violent as those observed with the older units. Of 
particular note is the fact that sustained fues were not 
observed in the feeder-breaker trials with randomly 
positioned units, which represents a worst case mine 
accident scenario, since the fIxed unit and locked breaker 
tests are too contrived. In this respect, the SR-I00 is 
superior to the older chemical units. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The overall results of the series of destructive tests 
performed on the SR-I00 are summarized in table 12; for 
purposes of comparison the results of similar tests with the 
older chemical and com pressed oxygen units are also 
shown. 
The results of the water activation trials with the two 
chemical units buried in a coalbed were pretty much the 
same, although slightly higher coalbed temperatures were 
observed in the test with the SR-l00. However, based on 
the logic outlined in reference 1, it can be concluded that 
the SR-l 00 does not pose any significant hazard in terms 
of direct coal ignition or induced spontaneous ignition. 
The SR-lOO and the older chemical units exhibited 
only mild burning in the bonfire trials and produced short-
lived fues in the bullet impact tests. The compressed 
oxygen SCSR's produced more vioient reactions in both 
of these tests because of the ready availability of pure 
oxygen, which enhanced the burning reactions. Neither 
of these tests is very realistic in terms of the mine 
environment. 
Table 12.-Occurrence of combustion reactions In tes .. with various SCSR'a 
Test type 
Water activation in 
coal bed. 
Bonfire . . . .. .. .. . , 
Bullet impact . . ... . 
Simulated roof fall .. 
Equipment runover: 
Rubber-tired vehicle 
Bulldozer . ...... . 
Continuous miner .. 
Feeder-breaker: 
Random ........ . 
Fixed .. ........ . 
Locked ......... . 
SR-100 
No ............ .. 
Mild burning ..... . 
Short-lived fires ... . 
No ............ .. 
Not tested ....... . 
Sparks ..... . .. .. . 
Yes2 •••.• • •••••• 
Yes3 .... . . .. ... . 
Yes ............ . 
yes ............ . 
!With rock shard only. 
With severe slippage only. 
3Smoke only. 
Chemical 
No .. ....... .. . 
Mild burning .... . 
Short-lived fires .. . 
No .......... .. 
No .......... .. 
No ....... .. .. . 
No . ........ .. . 
Yes ... .. . . . . . . 
Not tested 
Not tested ..... . 
Compressed oxygen 
Not applicable. 
Violent burning. 
Violent reaction . 
Yes.! 
No. 
No. 
Yes. 
No. 
No. 
Yes. 
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Combustion reactions were not observed in the simu-
lated roof-fall trials with the older chemical units or with 
the SR-100. Mild combustion reactions were observed in 
roof-fall trials with the compressed oxygen units. How-
ever, this occurred only when a carefully aimed pointed 
rock shard was allowed to perforate the compressed oxy-
gen bottle. 
Combustion reactions were not observed in any of the 
equipment runover trials with the older chemical units. 
However, sparks were observed in the bulldozer runover 
tests with the SR-100 and ftres were observed in the 
continuous miner runover trials with both the SR-100 and 
the compressed oxygen units. It should be pointed out 
that extreme measures (continued track slippage) had to 
be taken to produce a combustion reaction with the 
SR-100. Since the older chemical units were not tested 
under these severe conditions and since the compressed 
oxygen units produced flfes without track slippage, it is 
concluded that the behavior of the SR -100 more resembled 
the behavior of the older chemical units than the 
compressed oxygen units under these circumstances. 
In the feeder-breaker trials, the SR-100 produced 
combustion reactions or short-lived flfes in experiments 
where the units were randomly fed through the breaker, 
and in tests with ftxed units and with the locked breaker 
assembly. The older chemical units produced more severe 
flfes in random-feed tests and presumably would have 
done so in the more severe ftxed and locked tests if they 
had been carried out. The compressed oxygen units pro-
duced violent combustion reactions only in the locked 
breaker trials when a well-aimed pick perforated the 
bottle. Again the results with the SR-100 and the older 
chemical units were very similar; the compressed oxygen 
units scored a little better because of the difficulty 
of perforating the oxygen bottle compared with the rela-
tive ease of producing a perforation in the chemical 
canisters. 
Overall, the SR-100 behaved pretty much like the older 
chemical SCSR's in all of the destructive tests. The 
compressed oxygen units produced more violent reactions 
when the oxygen bottles were perforated, which could be 
accomplished only under the most extreme circumstances. 
None of the destructive tests indicated that the SR-lOO 
posed any more serious hazard than the older chemical or 
compressed oxygen SCSR's. Since the mine-proven safety 
record of the older SCSR's is extremely good, the SR-100 
should be able to see service in underground mines pro-
vided that the safeguards outlined in references 1 and 2 
are taken into consideration. 
It has been pointed out that since the SR-lOO was 
designed to be belt wearable, personal exposure to the unit 
will be much more intense than with the larger chemical 
or compressed oxygen units, which are ordinarily stored 
and used only in emergency situations. The only possible 
hazard in the worn mode would be catastrophic failure of 
the starter oxygen bottle. Since the quantity of oxygen 
stored in the starter bottle is so small, the impulse 
transferred to the wearer would be negligible and the 
hazard would be limited to a startle effect. In view of the 
ruggedness of the stainless steel starter bottle as demon-
strated in the destructive tests, this is not viewed as a 
major concern. 
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